by Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman
How do Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman analyze loyalty networks, institutional dysfunction, and shifting global influence?
Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine patterns of incompetent leadership, patronage, and geopolitical repositioning amid controversies surrounding Trump-era appointees, Kash Patel, tariffs, and institutional dysfunction. Tsukerman argues that loyalty networks reward dependence over competence, while Jacobsen frames the issue within broader global reputational shifts toward Xi Jinping, Modi, the EU, Canada, and Ukraine. Their exchange contrasts power politics, public accountability, and strategic credibility in an unstable international order marked by fragmentation and distrust worldwide.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So, what is the pattern this week? That is where it becomes subtle. There are cases where people were not elected for their intelligence, but for their ability to mobilize sentiments among people who had not previously been politically activated, or among the broader public.
Others are intelligent, yet continue to make catastrophic mistakes because, culturally and politically, they have to pretend everything is fine. In strained language, they describe catastrophic failure as: “We are still working toward our strategic and political objectives, but events are not unfolding precisely as intended.” The former case would be someone like Trump; the latter would be someone like Putin.
These are two different cases. Intelligence is not the defining factor. The defining problem is the inability, or refusal, to accurately portray the substance of a situation and communicate it clearly to the public. People need to understand what is being done and why. Even when a government is losing, people should understand why a losing decision is being made—because it may be the least damaging option among worse alternatives.
It is a strange situation. These are forms of incompetent leadership. Those two forms seem especially present. What do you think of them? What other forms are you noticing lately?
Tsukerman: Many of these people are chosen for blind loyalty, their appeal to particular constituencies, or some combination of both. You would think it should be possible to find people who are both competent and loyal, but apparently something else is at work. There seems to be a deliberate selection of people who lack experience in their roles, show problematic patterns of behaviour, and have personal or psychological liabilities that become more entrenched once they gain power.
This is not simply about valuing loyalty over competence. It is also about creating dependence on the centre of power, so these individuals cannot easily become disenchanted or be co-opted by anyone else. If they depend on Trump and his top-level cabinet members for their positions, they have to remain inside the network until they become too embarrassing to keep.
They operate in a system of mutual dependency. Everyone is tied together, and they bail one another out. Recently, there have been several high-level departures.
This week, Labor Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer left Trump’s cabinet amid allegations of misconduct, including an alleged inappropriate relationship with a subordinate and misuse of department resources. Those allegations remain unproven.
It is also worth correcting the ideological label: she was not “borderline socialist.” She was a Republican with an unusually pro-labor profile for that party, including past union support.
And this is not what Trump complained about. She appealed to supposed ultra-conservatives, yet was broadly accepted despite holding what some would characterize as more left-leaning economic views. So it seems this is not about ideological alignment at all. It is about assembling a coalition of the willing—people who fit into the existing systems of power. It is about power, not ideology. It is not even about coherence at this point. If cabinet members are all over the map and share nothing in common, there will be no coherence, much less competence.
Jacobsen: The Atlantic published a piece based largely on anonymous sources about Kash Patel and his work habits, or lack thereof. The article included allegations about excessive drinking and erratic behavior. These remain allegations and have not been independently confirmed.
Yes, that has been reported widely. The issue with publications is that even waiting an additional week to verify claims would often be more responsible. He has indicated an intention to pursue legal action.
Tsukerman: Yes, he has claimed defamation. In the United States, however, it is very difficult for a public figure to win a lawsuit against a major publication unless there is clear evidence of fabrication or actual malice—meaning a deliberate intent to harm reputation through knowingly false claims.
Even if sources are mistaken or imperfect, as long as the publication is not deliberately attempting to defame and follows basic journalistic standards, the case becomes extremely difficult to win. He would need to demonstrate that the publication either fabricated information or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.
If the core of the reporting is accurate, that becomes a strong defense. Even if some details are exaggerated, what matters is whether the publication made a good-faith effort to corroborate the information rather than selectively confirming a narrative.
Of course, none of this resolves the underlying issue of how serious the situation is. Patel has clearly drawn criticism, but whether that is due to ideological conflict within the administration or genuine concerns about competence remains unclear. There is likely more to the story than a simple dispute with an unpopular superior.
I have heard from individuals personally familiar with Patel—some with no stake in U.S. government politics—that concerns about his behavior predate his current role. I have also heard from individuals broadly supportive of the administration that he lacks the relevant background to independently lead a major agency. These perspectives come from people I do not consider particularly biased against him.
That suggests there may be at least some basis for the concerns being reported. At the same time, the administration appears willing to stand by problematic figures, even when they generate dysfunction or public embarrassment simply by becoming the story themselves.
Yes, there will always be rumors, partisanship, and political maneuvering directed at any ruling administration. That is expected. But that does not mean the administration needs to provide ammunition to its critics. And in this case, it appears that is exactly what is happening.
Clearly, there is now such a strong pattern of poor behavior by so many appointees that it is hard to deny it and pretend everyone is perfectly competent and doing a great job. What are the results? Let us look at the results. Set aside the articles, the journalists’ claims, and the anonymous sources. Look at what has been publicly reported about their performance.
On labor and the economy, the administration has downplayed the damaging effects of tariffs on U.S. jobs and businesses. There have been multiple reports of businesses under pressure, including failures and bankruptcies connected to tariff-related costs.
Multiple FBI matters have also raised concerns about Kash Patel’s leadership. That is not solely based on anonymous sourcing in one article. Public reporting has already raised questions about his handling of cases, including the Charlie Kirk assassination investigation and the Brown University shooting investigation. In the Kirk case, Patel was criticized after initially saying a suspect was in custody, before that proved inaccurate.
In several cases, there appeared to be premature claims of progress, poor public communication, and avoidable mistakes. Some of those mistakes likely would not have been made by someone handling the role more professionally. So let us look at the facts as they are publicly available. In my view, the facts speak against these appointees.
Jacobsen: People seem to be leaning reputationally toward President Xi Jinping and the CCP, and toward Prime Minister Modi of India. In the latter case, India is a flawed but still the world’s largest democracy. In the former, China is an authoritarian state where politics ultimately governs the country, while capital and markets operate within limits set by the party and the Politburo.
Is this global leaning toward them a true stabilization metric, or is it a façade? Are people making a grave error because of the chaotic, immature, unprofessional, and reputationally damaging behavior of the Trump administration or the Putin regime? The Kash Patel case is a more specific example within that broader pattern.
Tsukerman: In India’s case, I do not think India yet has the soft power or global weight to be fully competitive with China, or to create the same level of spheres of influence that China has developed. India is becoming more active in various regions, including Africa, and Prime Minister Modi is clearly trying to play a more global role.
India’s non-aligned positioning, and its efforts to balance relations with the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union, show the complexity of its geopolitical situation. The results are varied and not always consistent.
So I would not say that countries are gravitating toward India in the same way some gravitate toward China. I am also not sure India even wants the same type of influence that China seeks. India may not be interested in drawing countries into its orbit so much as expanding its own room for maneuver.
India wants to be a strong economy with strong global relationships. I am not sure it is trying to exercise the same kind of weight as China, or to exercise it in the same way. I am not sure that comparison fully applies here, because India is fundamentally trying to play a different role from China. It is not yet in a position to play either role fully: the one it wants, or the one China is playing now.
India is working in that direction and has made real progress, but it still has a long way to go. I think a more likely new centre of gravity is the European Union, plus Canada, acting together with Ukraine.
Jacobsen: Ukraine increasingly, too.
Tsukerman: Yes, Ukraine increasingly as well. That adds significant population and strategic weight. I think they are much more actively trying to become a different centre of power, or centre of gravity, than India is. In my view, the EU overall has a very strong economy. With Hungary becoming more closely aligned with the broader EU position, that may strengthen the EU’s case.
That said, there is also a growing eagerness among some European leaders to gravitate toward China, which, in my opinion, naturally limits the EU’s efforts at independence.
The more China penetrates European markets, creates interdependencies, floods those markets, engages in technological co-optation, and works its way into the EU’s political sphere, the less independently the EU can act. That is because of the security issues involved and China’s ability to co-opt anything it touches once it moves in a direction that threatens Chinese interests, whether through competition or other means.
If the EU truly wants to become an independent bloc capable of competing with both the United States and China, it needs to become much more independent of China. I think there is a growing realization within NATO that China is a threat, both economically and in security terms. But the EU, as an entity, is still struggling with internal conflicts of interest that prevent it from fulfilling its own potential.
Jacobsen: Thank you very much for your time today, Irina.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a contributor to The Washington Outsider. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978–1–0692343; 978–1–0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369–6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018–7399; Online: ISSN, 2163–3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719–6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20–0708028), and others.