by Giovanni Giacalone
On January 3rd, 2025, Cecilia Sala’s family requested media silence regarding the case because the current stage is sensitive and the public debate on what should be done (or not) could extend the time and make a solution more complicated and distant.
The 29-years-old Italian reporter Cecilia Sala was kidnapped by the Iranian regime on December 19th, 2024, in reprisal for Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi’s arrest, carried out three days before at Milan’s airport by the Italian police on request of the US Department of Justice and the FBI, after landing on board a flight from Istanbul.
Another Iranian with US citizenship and connected to Abedini, Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi, was almost simultaneously arrested in Massachusetts. (Read the WO article on Sala’s capture here).
As indicated in the December 16th press release of the US DOJ, Sadeghi and Abedini have been charged with conspiring to export sophisticated electronic components from the United States to Iran in violation of US export control and sanctions laws. Abedini is also charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), that resulted in the deaths of US military personnel; specifically, the January 28th, 2024, drone strike on the Tower 22 outpost in Jordan, that killed three US soldiers and injured more than 40. According to the FBI, the drone used in the attack carried out by Tehran-backed militias was equipped with a navigation system produced by Abedini’s company.
On December 28th, the United States formalized the extradition request for Abedini and now, based on the documentation received from Washington, the Appeal Court of Milan will have to evaluate whether to accept Washington’s request. If the green light is given, the final decision will still be up to the Ministry of Justice, which will have 10 days to make the extradition effective. If convicted, both Abedini and Sadeghi could face sentences of up to 20 years.
Italy’s unsavory negotiations with the Khomeinist regime
The request for media silence announced by the Sala family is justifiable and indicates that there are secret negotiations ongoing between the Italian authorities (the Presidency of the Council of Ministries, the Foreign Ministry and AISE, Italy’s foreign intelligence) and the Iranian regime.
Incredibly, following the appeal by Sala’s parents, the Radical Party announced that it canceled the demonstration scheduled for January 6 in front of the Iranian embassy.
This is quite an unexpected move by the Radicals, considering that just a few days before they announced that they would not have complied with the government’s request not to demonstrate against the Iranian regime, as reported in an article by Il Giornale:
“The Italian government requested the public not to demonstrate against the Iranian regime, as illustrated by members of the Radical Party: “For ten days an Italian journalist has been in the hands of the bloodthirsty and liberticidal theocratic Iranian regime. The Italian government has asked not to demonstrate, but we disobey because when a journalist from a democratic country who only provides information is arrested without charge in a dictatorial country like Iran, the last thing to do is remain silent”.
In addition, a series of curious facts occurred. Firstly, after Sala’s detention on December 19th, Milan’s Public Prosecutor’s Office opened a model 45 file, that is, without suspects and without a criminal title, on the modality of Abedini’s arrest. The investigation concerns the short time between the issuance of the arrest warrant for extradition purposes, dated December 13th, and Abedini’s arrest occurred in less than three days.
What’s the point of complying with an international arrest warrant on December 16th, and then opening a model 45 file, only after Sala’s abduction, to examine if the arrest was properly executed?
Secondly, as well-explained by the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, the Italian judicial system is independent of political power and decisions will be taken by the judges based on legal considerations, but if they were to say no to Abedini’s release pending a decision on extradition, the government would still have the possibility of revoking the arrest warrant and allowing the Iranian to return home. The code provides that the revocation of the precautionary measure for extradition purposes “is always ordered if the Minister of Justice requests it”. In addition, the IRGC is not listed as a terrorist entity in Italy, and this could also be used as a pretext to release Abedini.
Meanwhile, some Italian media began to write about Abedini’s great will to learn the Italian language while in custody, and to pray for Cecilia Sala. Who are they trying to impress?
Iran’s objectives and Italy’s weakness
One of Iran’s first requests, after complaining about Abedini’s “abduction”, was to grant him house arrest. However, the Milan Prosecutor’s Office expressed a negative opinion regarding such a measure because the apartment indicated by the Iranian consulate where Abedini would be placed under arrest is located just three kilometers from the Iranian consular headquarters in Milan. As if it wasn’t enough, up until today, no request for electronic ankle tag use has been forwarded (specific consent from the detainee is required).
On January 15th, 2025, Milan’s Appeal Court will decide whether to apply house arrest for Mohammad Abedini or keep him in prison until the Italian judiciary and the Ministry of Justice consider his extradition to the United States.
It is worth recalling that in February 2023, Russian citizen Artem Uss, accused of smuggling military tech and wanted by the United States, escaped from house arrest in Milan. The measure had been granted by the Appeal Court of Milan and his escape sparked a barrage of accusations between the Meloni government and the Court judges.
Justice Minister, Carlo Nordio, placed the latter under disciplinary investigation, but it led to nothing. It is therefore hard to believe that the judges will back the government and ease Abedini’s judicial position (if that is the objective of the Italian government).
In addition, a potential second escape would seriously compromise Italy’s political and judicial credibility on an international level.
The house arrest problem is just part of a much larger issue that involves the real deal, the prisoner exchange between Mohammad Abedini and Cecilia Sala. It’s obvious that there is a clear difference between an arrest made under international law, as in the case of Abedini, and the kidnapping of a journalist to be used as a bargaining chip. Cecilia Sala’s detention is nothing other than an act of terrorism to obtain Abedini’s release and avoid extradition to the United States.
As explained by Prof. Adrian Calamel, an Iran expert and a Terrorism Fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute:”Tehran’s tactics have been categorized or defined as hostage diplomacy when in fact it is pure terrorism. The strategy has been quite simple, while the world plays inside the diplomatic sandbox the regime is playing outside, nabbing innocent people to be used as bargaining chips for billions of dollars or to spring a regime operative from arrest, extradition and imprisonment, the case with Cecilia Sala is no different”.
Italy’s intelligence failure?
One aspect to highlight concerns the inaction on the part of Italian intelligence in preventively protecting Cecilia Sala, as explained by former Italian foreign intelligence chief officer, Marco Mancini, in an interview with the newspaper Il Riformista on December 31st, 2024. According to Mancini, the Italian foreign intel had two days to contact Sala and have her evacuated from Iran; the operation could have been accomplished in a few hours, however, that did not happen.
A second point questioned by Mancini relates to the fact that the US authorities allegedly contacted the Italian police, but not the Italian intelligence, which could imply mistrust towards the latter. Is that a possibility? If so, why?
Thirdly, Mancini wonders why the Italians immediately arrested Abedini instead of following him and identifying the entire network of contacts, before proceeding with the arrest, and that is another key point. Why?
What Italy should now avoid
Needless to say, that the last things Italy would need to do are negotiating with the Iranian regime and eventually rejecting Abedini’s extradition to the United States.
It would be a tragicomic situation that will hopefully remain a hypothesis far from reality: first Italy proceeds to arrest an individual on the basis of an international arrest warrant, then tries to find a loophole to release him after the Iranian regime kidnaps an Italian citizen and despite the 2 days, between December 16th and 19th, the Italian intelligence had in order to get Cecilia Sala out of Iran, before her finally being arrested.
It is amusing to hear how the Iranian Foreign Ministry complained about “the United States using the hostage policy”, when the Iranian regime is globally famous for hostage-taking and the previously cited “hostage diplomacy”.
Additionally, the Iranian FM also complained about the United States wanting to harm Italy-Iran relations. What does that mean? Well, Italy can surely not be considered a country hostile to Iran. Unlike Germany, there have so far been no major operations against Iranian terror assets, the IRGC is not blacklisted as a terrorist entity, and the assurances received by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Iranian regime regarding the protection of Italian UNIFIL soldiers in Lebanon, following Tehran’s missile attack against Israel, date back to just last April.
Therefore, is Italy considering an exchange of prisoners with the Iranian regime? It is very possible. However, that could be a terrible choice for Italy. First and foremost, because the new Trump administration that is about to take office in Washington D.C. has a tough line on Iran and it would not swallow an Italian decision to have Abedini walk away free. This scenario would seriously compromise relations between Italy and the United States.
Secondly, Italy should keep well in mind that the Iranian regime is currently in a very weak situation, both, internationally and domestically. It is not possible to rule out that Khamanei and his accomplices could soon follow Assad’s footsteps, if not worse. The Meloni government could therefore find itself with a very upset US administration and, suddenly, no more friends in Teheran who are concerned with “Italy-Iran relations”. In fact, the Khomeinists are such friends that they did not hesitate to kidnap a 29-year-old Italian woman and lock her up at the infamous Evin prison.
Thirdly, potentially giving in to the Iranian regime’s pressure would encourage further kidnappings of foreign citizens by Iranian-sponsored terrorism and the so-called “hostage diplomacy” mastered by Teheran.
The only response should be to implement strong pressure and tougher measures against an agonizing regime willing to do anything to stay afloat. This is the right time to crush it. For how drastic this may sound, Italy now needs to pick sides: either the United States or the Iranian regime. The rule of law, or the rule of terrorism.