by Rustam Taghizade
On 23 April 2025, in a landmark ceremony in Baku, Azerbaijan and China transformed their bilateral ties into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signing twenty accords under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the agreements spanned legal harmonization, green-development targets, digital-economy frameworks and aerospace collaboration, the true significance lay in Baku’s strategic design: harnessing Beijing’s rising influence to cement Azerbaijan’s regional clout and reshape Eurasian geopolitics.
By mid-April, freight volumes along the so-called “Middle Corridor”—the trans-Caspian artery linking China to Europe via the South Caucasus—had surged by 40 percent year-on-year, generating over $450 million in transit fees for Azerbaijan. This corridor bypasses Russia’s overland networks and maritime chokepoints like the Bosphus and Suez Canal, recasting Baku from a peripheral energy exporter into a pivotal Eurasian crossroads. Each railcar and shipping container that traverses Azerbaijani territory enhances Baku’s diplomatic leverage, whether in negotiating Chinese land-bridge tariffs or in Brussels as Europe races to diversify supply-chain routes away from Russian and maritime vulnerabilities. Simultaneously, Chinese investment commitments—estimated at $3 billion through 2027—are insulating Azerbaijan from the volatility of oil markets. Beyond upgrading pipelines, Baku is channeling capital into 5G/6G networks, fintech startups, e-commerce platforms and nascent aerospace ventures. The planned launch of Azerbaijan’s first joint Sino-Azeri satellite in May 2025 symbolizes a broader shift from hydrocarbon dependency toward a knowledge-economy aspiration.
This economic diversification not only strengthens Baku’s hand in energy-export talks—reminding both Eastern and Western buyers that Azerbaijan controls critical transport and digital infrastructure—but also bolsters regime legitimacy by reducing social and political risks tied to oil price swings.
These developments have not escaped the notice of great powers. In Moscow, strategists view China’s deepening footprint—with upgraded Baku–Tbilisi–Kars rail links and joint cybersecurity exercises—as an encroachment on what Russia has long regarded as its near abroad. Kremlin analysts privately warn that Azerbaijan’s new partnerships threaten Russia’s exclusive transit monopoly and the CSTO-centered security architecture. At the same time, Washington and Brussels—eager to diversify Caspian energy away from Russia—must now contend with a new reality: Baku can choose Chinese financing without governance conditions or Western loans laden with strict covenants. That diplomatic lever compels the U.S. and EU to treat Azerbaijan not as a passive supplier but as an active partner whose strategic interests demand negotiation.
Azerbaijan’s observer role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) further illustrates its multipolar balancing act. At the 2024 SCO summit in Astana, Baku emphasized its strategic partnership with China while reaffirming ties with Russia and Central Asian states. The removal of visa requirements for Chinese visitors and pledges of joint law-enforcement exercises indicate how Azerbaijan is weaving itself into China-led security frameworks, diversifying beyond Russia’s CSTO. In effect, every SCO communiqué positions Baku as a broker among great powers—a middleweight actor exploiting multipolarity to amplify its own voice.
Energy diplomacy has also taken on an eastern dimension. April’s accords hinted at new LNG and pipeline talks to send Azerbaijani gas to China, reducing Beijing’s reliance on Middle Eastern suppliers. In parallel, joint solar and wind projects under BRI auspices and green-hydrogen pilot plants in the Caspian littoral signal Baku’s ambition to be seen as an environmentally responsible energy hub. This dual track—hydrocarbon diplomacy eastward, green-energy cooperation westward—not only upgrades Azerbaijan’s energy mix but burnishes its soft-power credentials in global climate forums. China’s growing role in Caspian resource governance could challenge Russia’s long-standing hegemony, opening space for new multilateral regimes overseeing fisheries, hydrocarbons and environmental protection. Enhanced rail and port links to Sino-Turkish corridors on the Black Sea may subtly shift NATO’s southeastern logistics calculus, offering Ankara and Baku fresh strategic options.
These shifts hold profound implications for U.S. interests. The deepening Azerbaijan–China partnership signals a move away from the Western liberal order: China’s no-strings engagement model undercuts Washington’s traditional leverage via governance conditionality. Azerbaijan’s integration into China-led infrastructure and security networks—exemplified by SCO engagement—creates friction with NATO’s southeastern strategy and complicates U.S. efforts to ensure alliance cohesion along the Black Sea flank. Moreover, if Azerbaijani gas flows east in larger volumes, Europe’s supplies will tighten, undermining U.S. and EU initiatives to replace Russian hydrocarbons with Caspian alternatives. Losing influence in the South Caucasus risks leaving Washington with diminished capacity to promote stability, democratic reform and Western integration in a region that serves as a strategic lock between East and West.
Looking ahead, Baku’s challenge is to convert strategic potential into lasting gains. The government must accelerate BRI projects with transparent procurement and robust local-content requirements to maximize domestic economic impact and avoid debt-trap vulnerabilities. Simultaneously, it needs to sustain multi-vector diplomacy—deepening ties with Turkey, the EU and the U.S.—to prevent overreliance on any single partner. In energy talks, Azerbaijan should leverage Chinese purchase commitments to extract firmer EU guarantees on Caspian gas imports, ensuring that eastward exports do not undercut westward obligations. Critically, engaging civil society—especially in green and digital initiatives—will broaden domestic buy-in and mitigate social risks.
Azerbaijan’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China is thus far more than a ceremonial upgrade. It is the centerpiece of Baku’s metamorphosis from borderland to bridge, from periphery to pivot. By weaving together transit ambition, economic diversification, great-power balancing, multilateral activism and energy diplomacy, Azerbaijan is scripting a new chapter in Eurasian geopolitics. The success of this grand design will hinge on Baku’s ability to deliver tangible improvements at home while maintaining the strategic agility to navigate an ever-shifting multipolar landscape—and on Washington’s skill in adapting its policies to remain a key stakeholder in Azerbaijan’s ascent.
It is also pertinent to note that the Trump administration, which is currently in power in the United States, is preoccupied with the war in Russia and Ukraine, as well as issues related to Iran. However, it is imperative to acknowledge the significance of the South Caucasus region in this context. The People’s Republic of China is a major economic partner of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus region. The two countries have expressed a desire to cooperate in the implementation of joint economic projects. Indeed, the United States also has significant interests in the South Caucasus. It is my supposition that the Republic of Azerbaijan considers these factors in its decision-making processes. The United States has the potential to collaborate with Azerbaijan to initiate new projects within the Middle Corridor.