by Gilles Touboul
At first glance, China’s Middle East policy may seem out of the ordinary. Beijing reacts swiftly to Iranian attacks. China opposes Israel or the US, condemns the strikes, speaks of sovereignty, and defends Iran’s right to protect its land. But when it comes to Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza, the tone changes. Beijing slams Israel, asks for a truce, defends Palestinian civilians, and upholds Lebanon’s sovereignty. However, China is careful not to appear as an ally of Hamas or Hezbollah.
Why this difference? Because China clearly separates supporting a country from supporting the armed groups linked to it. Iran is a country, an important partner for Beijing, and a regional power. When its land is attacked, China can easily point to principles it has long supported: sovereignty, keeping borders intact, and not interfering in other countries’ matters.
Hamas and Hezbollah are different. They are armed groups that are not official countries. Supporting them directly would make China pick a clear side in Middle Eastern conflicts. Beijing wants to avoid that. China wants to increase its influence in the region, but it does not want to get stuck in its wars.
In Lebanon, this is particularly clear. Beijing mostly talks about Lebanon’s sovereignty, stability, the Lebanese government, and respect for international resolutions. Hezbollah is rarely portrayed as an organization that China should defend. The same is true for Gaza. Beijing clearly supports the Palestinian cause. But supporting the Palestinians does not mean politically supporting Hamas.
This difference is essential. China wants to keep talking with Iran, Arab countries, the Palestinians, and also Israel. The more it is seen as supporting Hamas or Hezbollah, the more it risks losing this diplomatic freedom. Beijing therefore does not want to choose a camp definitively.
Behind this attitude is a deeper reason: China does not want to take on Iran’s network of regional partners. Tehran has built over the years a network including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Palestinian armed groups, and the Houthis in Yemen. But being close to Iran does not mean Beijing wants to be responsible for all these groups. Defending Iran does not automatically mean defending every group connected to Iran.
This is where we can talk about Chinese strategic restraint. China wants to grow its influence while keeping its responsibilities small. It wants to trade, invest, protect its sea routes, secure its energy supplies, and gain more diplomatic power. But it does not want to copy the American approach, with military bases, security promises, allies to protect, and sometimes wars that are hard to exit.
China’s cautious approach toward Hezbollah or Hamas is therefore not necessarily a weakness. It can also be seen as a strategy. If Hezbollah becomes much weaker tomorrow, China will not have tied its future to it. If Hamas loses much of its influence, Beijing can continue supporting the Palestinian cause. And if Iran remains an important regional power, the China-Iran relationship can continue.
This strategy has a possible weakness, though. Having influence without responsibilities works well when the region stays fairly stable. But the Middle East rarely stays that calm. If a big crisis threatens Chinese oil supplies, shipping routes, or investments, Beijing might find that economic influence alone is not always enough. At some point, a power that wants to shape what happens in the region may also need to take risks.
This provides China with an intriguing dilemma. More Middle Eastern nations may anticipate China’s political involvement as its economic influence grows. Beijing may begin to be viewed by Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf states, and perhaps Israel not only as a business partner but also as a diplomatic actor capable of crisis management. China might encounter an escalating conflict: the more power it acquires, the more difficult it might be to evade accountability.
The true test of Chinese strategic restraint is this. Beijing gains from its presence for the time being, but it does not bear the entire responsibility for regional security. However, China may eventually have to determine how much responsibility it is truly ready to take on if American influence keeps waning or becomes more selective..
Strategic restraint therefore works as long as China can separate influence from commitment. The question is whether that separation can survive once Beijing becomes one of the Middle East’s indispensable powers.
In every case, China keeps its options open. Perhaps this is the real Chinese rule in the Middle East: support enough to preserve influence, but never so much that you become dependent on your partners’ choices.
The United States has long linked power with responsibility: military alliances, bases, security promises, and interventions. China is looking for a different way. It wants more influence in the Middle East, but not more military duties. It wants to take advantage of the opportunities left by Washington without automatically taking on the costs that came with the American presence.
This strategy can be summed up in a few words: Be present without becoming trapped. Influence without entanglement.
This is one of the keys to understanding Chinese policy in the Middle East today.