by Talgat Kabdygali
The administration approach taken by Trump towards foreign policy has increasingly focused on addressing what it perceives as strategic threats posed by four nations: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, collectively dubbed “CRINK.” This policy shift, aimed at countering the global influence of CRINK has extended to the vital region of Central Asia. Further, it is geographically wedged between Russia and China and serves as a critical bridge for U.S. interests.
The term “CRINK” refers to four nations—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—that are perceived by the United States as strategic competitors due to their growing influence in global and regional affairs. Each of these nations has distinct platforms through which they project power. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplifies its economic strategy, channeling massive investments into infrastructure projects worldwide to expand its trade network and political leverage. Russia, on the other hand, emphasizes its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to foster economic integration and maintain its influence over former Soviet republics, including those in Central Asia. Iran’s focus lies in leveraging its strategic location and energy resources, alongside cultivating political and military ties, particularly in countries with significant Muslim populations. Meanwhile, North Korea, though geographically distant, contributes to global instability through its nuclear ambitions and provocative actions, which can indirectly affect Central Asia’s security landscape. Collectively, CRINK nations utilize these platforms to challenge the U.S.-led international order, often employing a combination of economic, military, and political tools to advance their interests and reduce U.S. influence in key regions like Central Asia.
The CRINK nations, in their regional strategies, have made substantial inroads in Central Asia. Additionally, each nation is pursuing influence through economic, political, or military avenues. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, for instance, have been noted as major forces reshaping Central Asian economies as well as infrastructure. In 2013 BRI of China was launched which has channelled billions into roads, railways, and other infrastructure projects in Central Asia, seeking to create new trade routes connecting Asia to Europe (Kelly, 2024). On the other side, Russia has promoted its Eurasian Economic Union as a trading bloc that has aimed at fostering economic integration among Central Asian and neighbouring countries. These initiatives have provided economic incentives for Central Asia but also intensified its reliance on external powers, particularly China and Russia.
The Trump administration has focused on CRINK including prioritizing a security and economic strategy for Central Asia that has further aimed to bolster sovereignty as well as counteract dependency on these powers. In 2020, the administration of Trump unveiled its first comprehensive strategy for Central Asia in over two decades, underscoring its commitment to protecting the autonomy of these nations’ and encouraging regional collaboration that sidesteps CRINK’s influence. This policy has even promoted Central Asia’s engagement with the West through economic and security partnerships. For example, the U.S. has established the C5+1 initiative as a dialogue platform between the United States and the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). It was developed further to promote mutual goals in regional security, economic development, and environmental resilience.
Security cooperation is a vital aspect of this U.S. strategy which has given the threats of terrorism and also potential instability at CRINK’s peripheries (Sciutto, 2024). In particular, Afghanistan’s proximity to Central Asia poses both risks as well as opportunities for these nations. The U.S. has provided financial support to Tajikistan to strengthen border security and counter drug trafficking. Furthermore, while also assisting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with training and equipment to improve their defence capabilities the US has financially supported the nation. This military cooperation has aimed to prevent the encroachment of extremist groups like ISIS, which could exploit regional instability and threaten U.S. interests.
In economic terms, the Trump administration has promoted private sector investments as a means of offering Central Asia an alternative to Chinese-led development projects in the region. It was termed that by enhancing economic ties through trade and investment, the U.S. seeks to lessen the economic dependence of Central Asia on China. However, U.S. investments in the region remain modest compared to the significant financial commitments of China under the BRI (Rudenshiold, 2024). American involvement has also faced the challenge of navigating restrictions of Central Asian governments on foreign investments, as well as competing with the largely unconditional support offered by China. Despite these challenges, the Trump administration has positioned American investments as a path to balanced economic development that upholds human rights and governance reforms.
Another component of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been noticed as an advocacy for political and social reforms. The Trump administration has expressed support for recent reforms in Uzbekistan as well as Kazakhstan. It has aimed to modernize governance structures and reduce corruption in such nations. Uzbekistan’s outreach to neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has also been positively received by the U.S. which has fostered regional cooperation and stability in these regions.
In summary, it can be defined that the Trump administration’s CRINK strategy in Central Asia is an intricate mix of security, economic, as well as diplomatic initiatives intended to strengthen the autonomy of these nations while balancing the influence of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Although the U.S. does not match China’s or Russia’s investments in the region, it presents itself as an alternative partner committed to regional sovereignty and stability.
References
Kelly, L. (2024). Trump looks to woo — and divide — Putin, Xi and Kim.
https://thehill.com/policy/international/4981798-trump-global-relations-adversaries/
Rudenshiold, E. (2024). C5+Trump: Getting the US Down to Business in Central Asia.
https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/c5trump-getting-the-us-down-to-business-in-central-asia/
Sciutto, J. (2024). Senior commanders react to Trump’s new cabinet picks.
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/13/politics/trump-shake-up-foreign-policy-order/index.html