by Rustam Taghizade
The initial outcome of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States on Saturday cannot be considered a complete success. It is hypothesised that in this particular instance, Iran is seeking to prolong the negotiation phase. The present article will analyse questions of the following nature: firstly, what is the current policy of the United States of America, and secondly, what plans have been formulated by the State of Israel? The hypothesis concerning the potential for direct or indirect interactions between representatives of the United States and Iran was substantiated by evidence of both. During the two-and-a-half-hour talks, the Iranian and US teams were seated in separate rooms, while the Omani Foreign Minister engaged in a series of written and verbal exchanges with both parties, thereby creating a state of mutual confusion. In the final analysis, Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Araghchi met in person to exchange a brief greeting as they exited the building, according to a statement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
It is imperative to acknowledge that Europe and China were excluded from these deliberations. This development has the effect of increasing the political prestige of the United States. Despite Iran’s insistence on indirect negotiations through Oman and direct negotiations with Mr. Trump, both parties were able to successfully resolve the issue. Consequently, Mr. Trump’s special representative, Steve Witkoff, engaged in direct dialogue with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at the conclusion of the meeting.
Trump’s Dilemma: What does Donald Trump want with regard to Iran policy right now? I think Donald Trump wants to resolve the nuclear issue with Iran at the table in a war. According to intelligence, Iran has enriched more than 60 percent of its uranium. Some sources say that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is in the near future. Therefore, the Trump administration first of all used the method of political intimidation, stating that its military bases are active in the waters near Iran. Then diplomatic negotiations were held. I think we should not forget that Iran is a regional power in the Middle East. Iran also has a strong religious ideology in its hands, along with proxy forces that constantly pose threats to Israel. The US does not intend to go to war with Iran. Because this will lead to more funds being allocated from the budget for the US in the economic struggle with China. Considering these factors, war does not seem attractive. The US also launched missile strikes on Iranian proxy forces before this meeting. I mean the Houthis. It was after this process that the Iranian government made a quick decision and started nuclear negotiations. Therefore, the logical solution for Iran is to hold discussions at the negotiating table.
Russia’s balancing act with Tehran: On 17 April, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi travelled to Moscow, bearing a letter from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressed to President Vladimir Putin. Iran has been engaging in close consultation with Russia — and previously with China — to demonstrate that it perceives the nuclear agreement as a multilateral strategic asset, rather than a bilateral U.S. concern. Russia, in its capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an original signatory to the JCPOA, possesses the ability to exercise the veto over any punitive measures, thereby inflicting a further diplomatic setback upon Tehran.
This assistance provides Iran with several strategic benefits: The provision of insurance coverage for diplomatic missions. The strengthening of Russian support has been shown to reduce the likelihood of Moscow providing covert support to the United States in the form of pressure or military options. This is a scenario of concern to Tehran, which perceives the mobilisation of American forces in the Gulf as a potential threat.
Supply Security: Furthermore, evidence suggests that Russia has purchased Iranian weapons for utilisation on the Ukrainian battlefield, and has signed a 20-year partnership with Tehran, thereby deepening its military and economic ties with the Islamic Republic. Conversely, Iran can anticipate the Kremlin’s opposition to any initiative that seeks to divest its enriched uranium reserves.
This communication is of a regional nature. By reiterating to the Kremlin the importance of its partnership on the Syrian battlefield – primarily by supporting Assad alongside Russia – Araqchi emphasises a narrative of mutual defence that extends beyond the scope of nuclear diplomacy.
For Russia, the situation is equally delicate. Putin’s actions suggest an attempt to position Moscow as a significant global actor, primarily through the strategic avoidance of an arms race in the Middle East. The Kremlin has publicly declared any strike against Iran to be “illegal and unacceptable”; however, it has refrained from committing to implementing nuclear restrictions, thereby leaving Moscow free to mediate without explicitly committing itself.
Saudi Arabia’s return to Tehran: Almost concurrently, the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, arrived in Tehran to deliver a personal message from King Salman to Khamenei. The continuation of the China-brokered rapprochement in 2023 suggests that Riyadh, like Tehran, recognises the value of diversifying its strategic options.
The Gulf Security Complex: The reopening of military-to-military channels by Saudi Arabia is intended to moderate Iran’s regional stance, extending from Yemen to Iraq, and to mitigate the risk of miscalculation as U.S. pressure intensifies. The following discussion will address the economic and political implications of the aforementioned factors. The enhancement of relations with Iran is poised to stabilise oil markets and fortify the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council, thereby serving as a significant counterbalance to the escalating influence of China and Russia in the region. Khamenei’s reception of Prince Khalid – in which he emphasised that “obstacles” to stronger ties could be removed – suggests that Tehran is willing to divide its interlocutors rather than face a united front that is hostile to its nuclear ambitions.
As Iran seeks diplomatic respite from Moscow and eases its Gulf isolation through Riyadh, the US campaign of “maximum pressure” risks losing as soon as negotiations begin.
Multipolar mediation: It is evident that neither Oman nor Europe possesses the capacity to rival Russia’s formidable veto power or Saudi Arabia’s substantial regional influence. Consequently, the establishment of a bilateral US-Iran deal can be achieved without the necessity of a broader consensus encompassing Moscow and Riyadh.
Security and Economic Trade: The Gulf states, who were previously keen to contain Iran, are now considering the relative benefits of regional trade and stability, as well as the risks of strengthening Tehran’s nuclear programme.
Conclusion: It appears that the US side is in a superior position at the April 19 meeting in Rome. Nevertheless, the political complexity of this meeting is undeniable. The Iranian side is attempting to extend the duration of the negotiations for as long as possible. Conversely, the United States has escalated its military operations against the Houthis in recent days. It is my belief that the Israeli side has communicated to the US the necessity of avoiding concessions during the meeting with Iran. However, the United States does not support the initiation of military hostilities with Iran. The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is contingent on the dynamic relationship between Israel and Iran, which can be conceptualised as a power struggle. Additionally, the names of Turkey and Saudi Arabia are mentioned. It is evident that the political dynamic between these four states is intensifying. In any event, the US is also developing its Middle Eastern policy in accordance with these processes. It is asserted that Iran remains a robust nation, with its religious ideology maintaining a strong presence. It is conceivable that nuclear negotiations may be held on multiple occasions in the near future. It is imperative to diminish Iran’s regional influence and to impose additional economic sanctions. It is imperative to recognise the paramount importance of this for the security of the Middle Eastern region.