From the Complexities of Hormuz to the Chokepoint of the Red Sea: The Gulf’s New Lung to Breathe the Breeze of the Arabian Sea

by Mohammed Salem Mujawar

An Analysis of Recent Developments in the Yemeni Conflict and Its Options in Light of the Islamabad Negotiations

Executive Summary

Six weeks after the violent escalation that began with a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran (February 28, 2026), the War of the Corridors is no longer a passing crisis remote from our Yemeni reality. The past few days—from the end of the UN mission’s mandate in Hodeidah to the appointment of Salafi leaders in the National Shield Forces, from the escalation of tribal conflict in Hadramaut to the announcement of the Saudi pipeline project through Yemen—have proven that Yemen has transformed from a regional war zone into a central player in the global energy equation.

In this final analysis, I argue that Yemen has become the only “breathing space” for the Gulf states to overcome the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea impasse, through an oil pipeline project reaching the Arabian Sea. However, this window remains contingent on three critical variables: the success of the Islamabad negotiations, the ability of Yemeni parties to contain the Hadramaut conflict, and the readiness for the battle of Hodeidah.

The key takeaway: The Houthis are not merely Iran’s proxy. They are a multi-alliance actor (with Russia and China as well), and they have used their political savvy to turn the Red Sea into a negotiating weapon that grants them significant international legitimacy. The legitimate government, meanwhile, appears too weak to lead any decisive military campaign, and the Transitional Council is preoccupied with its internal conflicts. The near future will witness a major settlement in Yemen—not a military victory—in which the three powers (Houthis, legitimate government, Transitional Council) share power and wealth in exchange for the opening of the waterways.

First: The War of the Waterways – From the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea

When Iran announced on March 2, 2026, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz with mines and speedboats, it did not anticipate that the response would come from two simultaneous directions: militarily, through U.S. warships crossing the strait for the first time since the war began; and strategically, through a Saudi announcement by prominent figures calling for the necessity of opening a canal to the Arabian Sea—a plan that is not new but has become an urgent necessity with the return of regional conflicts.

But what was most surprising was the Houthis’ ability to open a Red Sea front in near-perfect synchronization with Iranian operations. Since April 5, the Houthis have targeted commercial and military ships in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and deployed missile and drone platforms along the coast of Hodeidah following the end of the UN mission’s mandate (March 31). Not only that, they announced joint operations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Lebanese Hezbollah against targets in Eilat (April 6).

The message that the world understood—but only a few Yemenis understood—is that Yemen is no longer marginal. The Houthis now possess the capability to disrupt 10% of global oil supplies and 30% of container traffic through Bab al-Mandab, and they are using this leverage not only to serve Iran but also to strengthen their alliances with other powers (Russia and China), and to secure their position in any regional settlement.

Second: Yemeni Forces – Who Holds the Strings of the Game?

1. The Houthis: Multiple Alliances and Political Savvy

The mistaken reading that the Houthis are merely “Iran’s proxy” has proven false. The Houthis have forged alliances with Russia (the August 2022 visit and coordination of attacks on Yemeni oil exports), and with China (designating Chinese ships as safe in the Red Sea and hosting political delegations). These alliances have granted them:

• International cover at the Security Council (Russia and China’s abstention from renewing the UNMHA mandate)
• The ability to maneuver between the major powers, so that America cannot strike them without provoking Moscow and Beijing
• Popular legitimacy within Yemen and the Arab world, where they appear as those resisting “normalization” and “Israeli aggression”

What reinforces this view is that in recent days, the Houthis have noticeably raised the bar on their demands. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi stated on April 9: “We will not allow the enemy to dominate any front.” This means they will not accept a unilateral ceasefire in Yemen without simultaneous ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza. They want a comprehensive package that ensures the continuation of the Axis of Resistance, in exchange for which they would gain full political legitimacy domestically.

2. The Legitimate Government: Operating from a Position of Weakness

The legitimate government did not participate in the Islamabad negotiations and had no significant presence at the Salzburg conference. Instead, it gambled on appointing Salafi leaders (Al-Sanabi and Al-Lahji) to the National Shield Forces as a signal of readiness for the battle of Hodeidah. But this gamble faces several problems:

• Lack of internal unity: The National Shield Forces are only one faction among many, and other forces remain outside control.
• Deteriorating humanitarian situation: The collapse of services and the halt of oil exports have caused people in government-controlled areas to suffer poverty and disease, and the national army has become one of the weakest military forces due to being deprived of salaries for long months, weakening the popular base for any new war.
• Absolute dependence on Riyadh: The legitimate government behaves like a subordinate “local administration,” not a sovereign state. This has caused it to lose credibility even with its allies.

3. The Southern Transitional Council: Preoccupied with Internal Strife

The Transitional Council, which years ago was the most organized force in the south, saw its military forces fracture in Hadramaut as they rushed into a war serving agendas of countries working to undermine the Kingdom’s efforts in the region, putting Transitional Council forces in direct confrontation with Riyadh—and they quickly collapsed from the first blows. Then its political representatives fell into disarray following Aidrous’s mysterious departure, splitting into a faction that dissolved the council in Riyadh and became marginalized after losing its influence, and another faction still struggling without aim or compass, waiting for the miracle that would bring Aidrous al-Zubaidi back to the scene. The south generally is preoccupied with its internal conflicts and has returned to “square one,” revealing a state of confusion and hesitation.

Conclusion: The Houthis are the party best at reading the scene and exploiting regional and international changes, given the wavering legitimacy and a fragmented Transitional Council.

Third: Hadramaut – Fire Under the Tribal Ashes

In recent days, Hadramaut, Yemen’s oil capital, has witnessed dangerous developments, some of which we highlight:

• April 7, 2026: An armed tribal faction cuts off oil and food supplies to Al-Mahra province, in an open warning to the government and the Transitional Council.
• Days earlier: The deadline set by Hadramaut tribes expires, armed men deploy to oil field sites, and oil tankers are prevented from departing.
• April 3, 2026: News reports speak of Transitional Council planning for a “clash with security forces” in Mukalla.

These developments reflect a deep crisis: they confirm that the tribes are no longer willing to remain marginal. They possess weapons, determination, and the ability to halt oil production. Their demand for a share of revenues and greater representation in the management of the fields is “not a luxury” but a just right that the tribes see as usurped.

Options for the government and the Transitional Council in Hadramaut:

• The military option: A catastrophic choice that would lead to civil war within the province, fueled by local and international powers, and oil would stop for years.
• The tribal settlement: The realistic solution, offering tangible concessions: a share of revenues, development projects, representation in field management. But this requires time, and time is not available with rising regional tensions.

Fourth: The Arabian Sea Gateway – The Saudi Pipeline Project Through Yemen

On April 6, 2026, Saudi oil expert Mohammed Al-Sabban announced a plan to build a massive oil pipeline through Hadramaut and Al-Mahra, extending to the Arabian Sea. The idea is not new; it was proposed long ago and then taken up by Saudi research centers, most notably the Esbar Center not long ago. But its recent appearance is significant:

• The regional war and the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and their effects on Gulf and especially Saudi oil exports, have made the search for alternatives urgent and necessary.
• The return to using the Red Sea as a suffocating pressure card.
• The Arabian Sea appears to have become a window of hope for Saudi and Gulf energy in general.

Benefits of the project for Saudi Arabia:

• Bypassing both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab together, thus neutralizing Iranian and Houthi pressure cards.
• Strengthening influence in eastern Yemen (Al-Mahra and Hadramaut), tribal areas that may be more receptive to investment if handled properly.
• A strong bargaining chip against Iran, reducing the importance of Hormuz as a political blackmail tool.

Nearly insurmountable obstacles:

• The absence of a Yemeni state: Any project of this scale requires a state capable of signing the agreement and securing the pipeline for hundreds of kilometers through the deserts of Hadramaut, Al-Mahra, or passing through Shabwah province.
• Potential tribal opposition: Tribes may view the project as “plundering” their wealth or imposing Saudi guardianship over their lands, and this could be used as an media card against the Kingdom.
• Regional competition: The UAE has its own project via Fujairah port. Turning Yemen into an energy corridor would give Riyadh enormous influence in Sana’a, something Abu Dhabi may not welcome.
• The Houthi threat: Even if an agreement is reached with a government in Aden, the Houthis possess drones and ballistic missiles that have proven their ability to reach deep into Saudi territory. An exposed pipeline would be an easy hostage, just as oil facilities have been prevented from exporting for years.

Prediction: The project will remain in the realm of “studies and hopes,” tied to a comprehensive political settlement for Yemen. But its mere announcement at this time sends a political message: “The Gulf is seeking alternatives, and Yemen’s window to the Arabian Sea may be the strategic solution.”

Fifth: The Islamabad Negotiations – Key to a Settlement or a Broader War?

The negotiations that began on April 11 between the U.S. and Iran, mediated by Pakistan, are the primary determinant of Yemen’s future. Three scenarios:

Scenario One (Most Likely – 50%): A Partial, Extendable Agreement

• Freeze on enrichment in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions ($20–30 billion of frozen assets)
• Iranian commitment to “control the behavior of proxies” in the Red Sea, while keeping the Houthi threat as a reserve card
• Gradual opening of the Strait of Hormuz with international naval forces
• A timeline for Saudi-Houthi negotiations under UN auspices to open Yemen’s ports and Sana’a airport

Impact on Yemen: Relative calm in the Red Sea, the start of direct negotiations between Riyadh and Sana’a, and pressure on the Houthis to accept a political settlement in exchange for economic gains (salaries, port openings). The legitimate government and the Transitional Council will find themselves facing a fait accompli.

Scenario Two (30% probability): Collapse of Negotiations and Return to Escalation

• Iran insists on impossible conditions ($100 billion in one payment)
• The U.S. insists on fully reopening Hormuz before any sanctions relief
• Result: Return to escalation, re-closure of Hormuz, intensified Red Sea attacks, and the possibility of a wider war including attacks on Gulf oil infrastructure

Impact on Yemen: The Houthis will be required to open a broader maritime front, and attacks may directly target oil ports in Shabwah and Hadramaut, destroying oil field infrastructure. The battle for Hodeidah may erupt as a new front in a regional conflict with no borders.

Scenario Three (20% probability): Comprehensive Framework Agreement

• Linking the nuclear issue with the proxy and Red Sea files as one package
• Formation of a high-level international committee to oversee implementation
• A long timeline (18–24 months) for lifting sanctions

Impact on Yemen: Long-term calm, a major political settlement including the Houthis as a core party, and the start of reconstruction with Gulf and international funding. This scenario is best for Yemen, but the least likely due to the complexities of other files.

Conclusion: Whatever the outcome, Yemen will be strongly present. If the negotiations succeed, the Houthis will gain. If they fail, the Houthis will be at the heart of the storm.

Sixth: The Battle for Hodeidah – Between Military Preparation and a War of Attrition

The end of the UN mission’s mandate on March 31, 2026, has opened the door to questions: Will government forces launch a battle to retake Hodeidah?

The situation on the ground:

• The Houthis: Have deployed new missile and drone launchers along Hodeidah’s coast, expanded naval minefields, and turned the port into an integrated naval operations base.
• The government: Appointed Salafi leaders (Al-Mahdar, Al-Sanabi, and Al-Lahji) to the National Shield Forces, and Defense Minister Major General Taher Al-Aqili announced “the highest levels of readiness” to wage a decisive battle (April 9).

Available options:

1. An immediate, all-out battle: Extremely high risk. Houthi fortifications are strong, casualties in lives and equipment would be heavy. The international community will not tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in Hodeidah, especially with food aid stopped for millions of Yemenis. This option is unlikely at present.
2. Waiting for the results of the Islamabad negotiations: The most likely scenario. Military leadership wants to see where things are headed in Islamabad before taking any major step. If the negotiations succeed and Iran makes concessions, the Houthis might be more flexible to accept a settlement in Hodeidah without war.
3. A long war of attrition: Sporadic attacks on the outskirts of Hodeidah and its surroundings, aiming to cut supply lines to the Houthis and starve their positions, rather than a direct assault on the city. This option may be the most realistic, as it wears down the Houthis over time without igniting a full-scale confrontation.

Prediction: We will not see a full-scale battle to liberate Hodeidah in the coming weeks. The military option will remain a pressure card on the Houthis, while a “neither war nor peace” situation continues until the contours of the grand bargain become clear in Islamabad. If the negotiations reach a dead end, we may see limited military action aimed at improving the negotiating position, but it will not be a full invasion.

Seventh: Concluding Analysis – What Awaits Yemen?

After reviewing all the variables, I present the following predictions for the coming phase:

In the Short Term (weeks):

• Continued Islamabad negotiations with a tendency toward a partial agreement, followed by gradual relief in the Red Sea.
• A limited decline in Houthi attacks, but without a complete halt (to keep the risk premium high).
• Intensified tribal mediation in Hadramaut to avoid an explosion.
• Hodeidah remaining in a state of anticipation, with limited skirmishes on the outskirts.

In the Medium Term (6–12 months):

• A framework agreement between the U.S. and Iran including a freeze on enrichment in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions, and an Iranian commitment to “control the behavior of proxies and allies.”
• Direct Saudi-Houthi negotiations under UN auspices, resulting in:
• Gradual opening of Sana’a airport and Hodeidah ports
• Payment of salaries to employees in Houthi-controlled areas from government oil revenues
• Formation of a new presidential council that includes the Houthis in some formula (political participation, not full control)
• The legitimate government and Transitional Council will find themselves facing a fait accompli: either join the settlement or remain outside the game. Most likely they will join under pressure, with southerners obtaining broad powers in the south within the framework of the Yemeni state.

In the Long Term (two years):

• Gradual transformation of the Houthis into a political party, freezing (or changing) their extremist slogans in exchange for international legitimacy and funding for reconstruction in their areas.
• Start of reconstruction with Gulf and international funding, on condition that it includes Houthi areas.
• The National Shield Forces and Transitional Council forces remaining as local powers, but under a unified political umbrella (a fragile umbrella, but one that stops the war).
• The Saudi oil pipeline project through Yemen will remain in the study phase and may see the light only after full political and security stability, which will require more time.

Final Conclusion: Yemen Writes Its Future as a Global Hub for Energy Corridors

What is happening in Yemen today is more than a civil war. It is an open geopolitical conflict over waterways, energy, and influence, where Iranian, Russian, Chinese, American, and Gulf interests intersect. The Houthis have proven that they are not merely a tool, but rather astute actors who have leveraged this interplay to their advantage, turning the Red Sea into a pressure card that earns them legitimacy and gains.

In contrast, the legitimate government appears unable to regain the initiative, and the Transitional Council is preoccupied with its internal conflicts. The only way out of this impasse is a major political settlement in which everyone shares power and wealth in exchange for opening the waterways.

The Arabian Sea window (the Saudi pipeline project) may be a long-term strategic solution, but it remains contingent on Yemen’s stability first. The irony is that Yemen’s stability itself hinges on the success of the Islamabad negotiations. The entire region awaits the outcome of those negotiations, which may shape the Middle East for the coming decade.

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