by Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman
How does Irina Tsukerman explain intelligence failures, deterrence, and the need for multilateral strategic planning in today’s interconnected security environment?
Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Irina Tsukerman on intelligence failure, deterrence, and strategic planning in an era of cascading geopolitical shocks. Their exchange argues that modern conflict is shaped by interdependence: drones proliferate cheaply, energy chokepoints transmit regional crises globally, and inadequate coordination magnifies risk. Tsukerman contends that secrecy is often overstated, while poor logistics, interceptor shortages, weak analytics, overclassification, and groupthink produce preventable vulnerabilities. She emphasizes allied intelligence sharing, cultural and linguistic expertise, and visible multilateral preparedness as tools of deterrence. Jacobsen frames the broader lesson plainly: collective foresight, not reactive improvisation, is now a basic requirement of security today.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: As you were saying, prior planning prevents poor performance. Another major point is that there are no true islands anymore. I cannot think of any truly isolated group, even among Amazonian tribes in Brazil; many are now known to the outside world. For example, the well-known case of the murdered American evangelist involved North Sentinel Island in India, not an Amazonian tribe. In the Amazon, a more accurate comparison is the growing danger faced by uncontacted Indigenous peoples from outside intrusion, including evangelists, criminal networks, and illegal resource exploitation.
We are seeing similar shockwaves in conflict zones. Drone warfare is no longer confined to one theatre. We have seen it in Ukraine, Iran, and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is the point: once technologies become cheaper, more available, and easier to adapt through black markets, supply chains, and commercial components, they spread.
The same applies to economic interdependence. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted grain, fertilizer, and energy markets far beyond the battlefield. In the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz remains a major chokepoint, with roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passing through it. Disruptions there affect oil, gas, petrochemicals, and global shipping. It is more accurate to say that Gulf energy infrastructure and LNG flows have been threatened or disrupted, rather than referring to a specific “Qatari LNG line.”
Canada is not insulated from that. However, the earlier energy figure required correction. Canada does not get only one-fifth of its energy from renewables in the electricity sense; roughly two-thirds of Canadian electricity generation is renewable, while renewables account for a much smaller share—around one-sixth—of total end-use energy demand. The broader point remains: Canada is still exposed to fossil-fuel-linked global shocks.
The conclusion is straightforward: plan collectively. The practical question is how states, especially middle powers, can build foresight and act strategically at the international and multilateral levels to reduce negative shockwaves and generate positive ones before crises cascade.
Irina Tsukerman: The core issue is that interdependence has outpaced governance. States are now connected through energy markets, supply chains, and dual-use technologies in ways that create systemic risk. That means foresight is not optional—it is a requirement for stability. Strategic planning must move beyond national frameworks and toward coordinated, multilateral approaches that anticipate second- and third-order effects.
Middle powers can play a constructive role by forming flexible coalitions around specific risks—energy security, supply chain resilience, or technological proliferation. However, these efforts only succeed if they are grounded in realistic assessments of capacity and aligned incentives, not idealism alone.
Ultimately, the objective is not to eliminate shocks—that is impossible—but to absorb and redirect them. Effective planning allows states to mitigate harm, stabilize systems, and, where possible, leverage disruption for constructive outcomes rather than cascading failure.
One of the arguments I keep hearing is that “shock and awe” or highly compartmentalized operations are necessary to prevent leaks—that if prior plans had been shared with European or Middle Eastern partners, someone would have leaked them to Iran. I am not convinced. The plans themselves appear to have been fluid, and there is little indication that a stable, coherent strategy existed early on. Moreover, leaks often originate internally; concerns about information security do not justify a lack of coordination.
More importantly, coordination does not require sharing operational details. After the 12-day conflict, it was evident that escalation could resume under any administration. That was the moment to begin defensive planning—logistics, supply chains, and energy infrastructure protection—without exposing sensitive plans. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, for example, has been well established through prior disruptions involving Iranian proxies. That risk alone justified advance preparation.
The broader issue is that much of what failed was predictable. Interceptor shortages, inefficient use of high-cost systems against low-cost drones, and weak regional integration were observable problems in prior operations. These are not intelligence-sensitive matters; they are basic elements of military planning and resource management.
In contrast, where the United States and Israel did engage in integrated planning at the tactical level, performance was significantly stronger. That suggests the problem was not feasibility, but inconsistency in applying those same standards across the broader regional framework.
A visible pattern of coordinated defensive preparation could also have had a deterrent effect. If Iran had observed a well-integrated regional posture, it might have been less willing to escalate or test perceived weaknesses. Instead, the lack of preparation signaled opportunity.
So the lesson is not that secrecy prevented coordination, but that insufficient preparation created vulnerability. Iran did not need leaks to infer intent—it could observe the gaps directly.
The central issue is that deterrence is built as much on visible readiness as on capability. When planning is fragmented or delayed, adversaries interpret that as strategic hesitation rather than prudence. In this case, the absence of coordinated defensive measures—particularly around energy security and interceptor allocation—likely reinforced the perception that escalation could be managed or even exploited.
Foresight, therefore, is not merely about anticipating actions, but about shaping perceptions. Multilateral coordination, even at a defensive and logistical level, signals cohesion and raises the cost of miscalculation. Without that, even sophisticated capabilities can appear unreliable in practice.
Strategically, the objective should be layered preparedness: integrated defense planning, efficient allocation of resources, and visible cooperation among regional and allied actors. These measures do not require disclosure of operational plans, but they do require political will and sustained coordination.
Jacobsen: We have intelligence services and military operations that sometimes work in coordination and sometimes do not. However, I do not think most citizens realize how porous the system can be when conducting broad scans for threats. These systems tend to perform best when they have a specific target and can plan accordingly—for example, highly targeted operations such as those involving pagers. Outside of that, there is more uncertainty. What are your thoughts on resource constraints, intelligence limitations, and related challenges?
Tsukerman: To some extent, intelligence is only as effective as the teams involved and the specificity of their targets. It is not possible to predict every threat; no agency has sufficient personnel or resources for that. One effective countermeasure is intelligence sharing between allies.
Second, analytical units play a critical role. Their responsibility is to review open-source intelligence, as well as human and signals intelligence, for indicators of escalation and warning signs. In my view, insufficient resources are allocated to analytics. At the same time, there is excessive classification and over-collection of signals, resulting in more data than can be meaningfully processed—even with advanced AI tools. Accumulating information without the capacity to analyze it provides little benefit.
Much of this information is also coded or context-dependent, requiring cultural and linguistic expertise. There are not enough specialists in these areas to properly interpret the data, even if additional resources were available.
Another issue is the presence of blind spots and groupthink. If analysts focus only on expected patterns—such as terrorism indicators—they may overlook political dynamics within governments. Non-state actors are often supported by state or quasi-state entities, including factions within otherwise friendly governments. Without examining these dynamics, analysts miss critical parts of the broader picture.
There is also an overreliance on certain sources. Intelligence relationships can become too dependent on specific informants or partner states, creating the risk of bias or incomplete information. It is essential to verify information and seek alternative perspectives rather than relying exclusively on a single channel.
Overall, intelligence practices have, in some cases, become less rigorous and more superficial, failing to account for the complexity and fluidity of the current geopolitical environment.
Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a contributor to The Washington Outsider. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978–1–0692343; 978–1–0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369–6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018–7399; Online: ISSN, 2163–3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719–6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20–0708028), and others.